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MINIMALIST SOLUTION TO WILLIAMSON
COUNTY
RAYMOND J. NHAN∗
ABSTRACT
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank of Johnson County relegated Fifth Amendment takings claims to
a second-class of federal rights. Before a takings plaintiff can sue in
federal court, she must first seek compensation through an “adequate
state procedure.” Many federal courts have held that requirement to
mean a takings litigant must first seek compensation through state courts
if that state provides an inverse condemnation proceeding. However, if
a takings litigant sues in state court, she will be unable to sue in federal
court because of issue preclusion. This effectively shuts the federal
courthouse door to many property owners. Only two Supreme Court
justices have shown any interest in revisiting Williamson County. Thus,
land use attorneys who are concerned about federal court access for
takings plaintiffs should craft a case that would attract the Supreme
Court’s attention. This Article argues that land use lawyers should
present the Court with a case in which the property owner has used a
non-judicial procedure to seek compensation (such as asking for
compensation from a county board). The Court could then rule that
such a non-judicial procedure is an “adequate state procedure” that
satisfies Williamson County’s requirements.
This ruling would
minimize the negative effects that Williamson County has wrought on
takings plaintiffs.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1991, Leslie and Ben, a newlywed couple, purchased a quaint
three-bedroom home in Pawnee, Indiana—a home in which they
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hoped to raise a family.1 Leslie and Ben came to love Pawnee and the
community. When the empty lot across the street went up for sale in
1994, they immediately purchased it as an investment property. They
hoped to use the investment proceeds to pay for their children’s college
education.
Fast-forward 20 years. Leslie and Ben’s triplets were high school
seniors, and they tried to sell their investment property so that they
could use the proceeds to pay for their children’s educations. While
they were trying to sell their investment property, they learned that
Pawnee passed a law, Ordinance 30, five years prior prohibiting all
development of their investment property. In other words, Ordinance
30 denied Leslie and Ben all economically beneficial use of their land.
Pawnee’s planning commission has an application process in
which residents can request compensation for alleged regulatory
takings. Leslie and Ben thus went to the planning commission to try to
receive compensation for the value of the property they had lost. They
submitted documents detailing the value of their property and how
they purchased the property as an investment parcel. The planning
commission denied their request for compensation.
Soon after, Leslie and Ben sued Pawnee, claiming that Ordinance
30 caused a per se regulatory taking.2 Because Leslie and Ben hired a
savvy lawyer, they brought their takings claim in Indiana state court.
The lawyer was aware of Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, which requires such
takings plaintiffs to ripen their case by seeking compensation through
adequate state procedures,3 and how some circuit courts interpret
“adequate state procedure” to mean seeking just compensation in state
court before turning to the federal judiciary.4
After Leslie and Ben sued in state court, Pawnee began engaging
in gamesmanship. Pawnee removed Leslie and Ben’s lawsuit to federal
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which allows defendants to remove any
claim to federal court if the case could have originally been filed there.5
1. Parks and Recreation (NBC Television Broadcast 2009-2015).
2. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (holding property owner
suffers a taking when government enacts a regulation that denies all economically beneficial use
of property).
3. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S.
172, 194–97 (1985).
4. See, e.g., Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 354 n. 8 (2d Cir. 2005);
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87, 92–94 (1st Cir. 2003).
5. This example is based loosely off several actual cases. See, e.g., Sansotta v. Town of Nags
Head, 724 F.3d 533, 545 (4th Cir. 2013) (town removing just compensation case from state court
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Because the federal court had subject-matter jurisdiction based on the
Fifth Amendment takings claim,6 the state court granted Pawnee’s
motion to remove Leslie and Ben’s regulatory takings claim to the
Southern District of Indiana.
Two years after Pawnee removed Leslie and Ben’s takings claim
to federal court, the city moved to dismiss the case as unripe because
the couple had not litigated in state court, the adequate state procedure
for obtaining compensation.7 The Southern District of Indiana agreed
with Pawnee and dismissed Leslie and Ben’s takings claim as unripe,
despite the case having been removed by the city from state court of
federal court.8
In a final salvo and at great expense, Leslie and Ben filed their
claim in state court again. This time, Pawnee litigated the issue through
Indiana state court. At the end of the case, the Indiana state court
denied Leslie and Ben’s just compensation claim. Leslie and Ben then
sought to return to federal court to litigate their now-ripe Fifth
Amendment just compensation claim. But the Southern District of
Indiana invoked San Remo v. County and City of San Francisco, and
held that issue preclusion applied to the state court litigation—which
Williamson County required they endure.9
After years of litigation, Leslie and Ben grew tired. They resigned
to the fact that they would never receive just compensation. They gave
up.

Leslie and Ben’s story is not unusual.10 Williamson County has
functionally barred property owners from accessing federal court.
Indeed, Williamson County makes it very difficult for takings plaintiffs
to access any court.11 Local governments engage in a procedural game,
to federal court, then arguing case is unripe).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
7. Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 545.
8. In fact, courts have used Williamson County’s requirement to send cases to state court,
even after the government removes a case, and agrees that jurisdiction is proper in federal court.
See, e.g., Save More Food Mkts, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., No. 16-cv-447-jdp, 2016 WL 4131866
(W.D. Wisc. Aug 3, 2016).
9. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 335 (2005).
10. See, e.g., Sansotta, 724 F.3d 533; Winer v. Clay Township, No. 3:15-cv-276, 2016 WL
3676717 (S.D. Ohio July 6, 2016); Gelentt v. Township of Chapman, No. 4:15-cv-1910, 2015 WL
7454757 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2015).
11. See Michael Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory Takings, 3
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 106-09 (2000) (hereinafter Bait & Switch) (explaining the Dodd
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like the kind that Pawnee used with Leslie and Ben, to prevent takings
litigants from having their day before a judge.
But in April 2016, takings plaintiffs received a welcoming sign.
Though the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Arrigoni Enterprises v.
Town of Durham, a case asking the Court to revisit Williams County,
Justice Thomas dissented from denial of certiorari.12 In his dissent
from denial, which Justice Kennedy joined, Justice Thomas noted that
“the justification for Williamson County’s state-litigation requirement
are suspect, while its impact on takings plaintiffs is dramatic.”13 He
noted that Williamson County has inspired “gamesmanship” from
lower courts14—like that which Pawnee used. Though the Supreme
Court did not accept Arrigoni, some Justices are apparently aware of
Williamson County’s shell game15 and are looking to overrule it.
Coupled with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in San Remo,
which questioned Williamson County’s logic,16 property rights
advocates may have cautious optimism that the Court will soon
eliminate the state litigation rule.
Now that some Justices have signaled their interest in revisiting
Williamson County, property rights experts and jurisdictional mavens
must present a “cert-worthy” case to the Court.17 Many considerations
go into deciding whether a case is “cert-worthy,” such as identifying a
circuit split,18 but many commentators have written about Williamson
County’s incoherence and why the court should overrule it.19 Instead
of asking the Court to overrule Williamson County, plaintiffs should
provide the Justices an opportunity to make incremental changes.
family’s and the Rainey brother’s struggle to get a court to hear their takings case).
12. Arrigoni Enters., LLC v. Town of Durham, 136 S. Ct. 1409 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial).
13. Id. at 1409 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
14. Id.
15. See generally Michael Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There from
Here: Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches the Selfparody Stage, 36 URB. L 671 (2004).
16. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
17. Certainly, lower courts may take the same steps I propose the Supreme Court take to
undo the damage that Williamson County has caused.
18. Evan Bernick, The Circuit Splits are Out There—And the Court Should Resolve Them,
16 ENGAGE 36, 36 (2015) (“[Chief Justice John Roberts] emphasized that circuit splits are far and
away the most important consideration in deciding whether to grant cert petitions.”).
19. See, e.g., Bait & Switch, supra note 11; Joshua D. Hawley, The Beginning of the End?
Horne v. Dep’t of Agriculture and the Future of Williamson County, 2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
245, 245 (2015); R.S. Radford & Jennifer Fry Thompson, The Accidental Abstention Doctrine:
After Thirty Years, the Case for Diverting Federal Takings Claim to State Court Under Williamson
County Has Yet to Be Made, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 567, 612–13 (2015).
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Justices prefer incremental changes to overruling cases.20 Therefore,
the opportunity to make a narrow ruling would be more attractive to
the Court.
Thus, property owners should provide the Court with an
opportunity to narrow Williamson County without overruling it.21
Plaintiffs should present the Court with an opportunity to make a
minimalist ruling that would modify Williamson County’s drastic
consequences, and this Article explains how it can be done. An ideal
minimalist case would eliminate the ripeness-removal and Williamson
County-San Remo traps that plagued Leslie and Ben. By eliminating
these two traps, the Court can ensure that takings litigants can have
their cases heard in federal court.
To accomplish this solution, this article proceeds in three parts.
Part I lays out the history of Williamson County, San Remo, and how
the ripeness-removal and Williamson County-San Remo traps came to
be. Part II addresses why the Court should fix Williamson County’s
defects. Finally, Part III provides a minimalist solution to the ripenessremoval and Williamson County-San Remo traps: interpret “adequate
state procedure” to mean any non-judicial state procedure that can
provide compensation.
II. JUST COMPENSATION AND RIPENESS
A. Williamson County and the Origins of a Ripe Mess
In 1973, Temple Hill County Estates began developing its
property after the Williamson County Planning Commission approved
its development plans.22 In 1977, the Planning Commission changed
the county’s zoning requirements.23 Though the Planning Commission
previously approved Temple Hill’s plat submissions, it rejected them
in 1980.24 Because of the decision, Temple Hill’s land became
undevelopable.25 Hamilton Bank then foreclosed on the property and

20. See Diane S. Sykes, Minimalism & Its Limits, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 17, 17–18 (2015)
(discussing minimalism during the Roberts Court).
21. Cf. id. at 19 (“On a more philosophical level, modern minimalism promotes itself as a
hedge against judicial supremacy. It calls on judges to go slowly and in small steps.”).
22. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City v. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 729 F.2d
402, 403 (6th Cir. 1984).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See id.
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sued the Planning Commission for an unconstitutional regulatory
taking.26
The District Court granted a judgment notwithstanding the jury
verdict for the commission on the takings claim.27 That court held that
there was no taking, reasoning that Tennessee law estopped the
Planning Commission from applying the regulation that allegedly
caused the taking.28 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that evidence
supported the jury verdict and finding that there was a taking because
the Commission denied the bank all economic use of its land for some
time.29 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
“Federal, State, and Local government must pay money damages to a
landowner whose property allegedly had been ‘taken’ temporarily by
application of government regulation.”30
Instead of answering this question, the Court created a novel
jurisdictional rule for Fifth Amendment claims. First, the Court
reasoned that Hamilton Bank’s claim was unripe.31 It said that the bank
had not received a final decision regarding its zoning ordinance
because it did not seek variances that would have allowed it to develop
its land.32 Second, the Court held that a Fifth Amendment claim is
unripe until the state actor denies just compensation. If a state
provides “adequate procedure” to obtain just compensation, property
owners cannot claim a Fifth Amendment violation until they seek and
are denied compensation through a state procedure.33 The Court wrote
that the government violates the Fifth Amendment only when it takes
property and fails to pay compensation.34 This means takings plaintiffs
must first seek compensation from the state or local government before
suing in federal court.35
Williamson County’s ripeness rule can be distilled into two prongs:
a plaintiff’s taking claim is unripe until (1) the government makes a
final decision and (2) the claimant seeks just compensation through an
adequate state procedure for obtaining compensation and is denied.36
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 403–04.
Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 175.
Id.
Id. at 183–84.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 186
Id.
Id. at 195.
Id.
Id.
Katherine Mims Crocker, Justifying a Prudential Solution to the Williamson County
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B. San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco
Property owners immediately felt Williamson County’s effects. If
a takings plaintiff complied with Williamson County by seeking
compensation through state court, then a federal court could not hear
his case because of claim or issue preclusion. In other words, a valid
state court decision prevents a federal court from hearing a case based
on the same factual scenario. Most circuits declined to create an
exception to the preclusion rule, even if the plaintiff was forced to go
through state court to satisfy Williamson County.37 Only the Second
Circuit constructed an exemption to the preclusion rule when a litigant
was forced to go through state court litigation.38
The Supreme Court addressed this circuit split in San Remo. That
case presented a straightforward question: “Is a Fifth Amendment
Takings claim barred by issue preclusion based on a judgment denying
compensation solely under state law which was rendered in a state
court proceeding that was required to ripen the Federal Takings
claim?”39 Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens framed the issue
differently. He asked whether “federal courts may craft an exception
to the full faith and credit statute . . . for claims brought under the
Takings Clause.”40
In San Remo, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors forbade the
San Remo Hotel from converting rooms for tourists use without
reapplying and paying a fee.41 In response, the hotel sued the Board
for causing a taking. After San Remo sued in state court, the parties
stayed the case while the hotel litigated in federal court.42 The Ninth
Circuit applied Pullman abstention43 to the case, reasoning that the

Ripeness Puzzle, 49 GA. L. REV. 163, 166–68 (2014).
37. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Pitkin Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 142 F.3d 1319, 1324 (10th Cir.
1998) (“We conclude the Williamson ripeness requirement is insufficient to preclude application
of res judicata and collateral estoppel principles in this case.”); Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass’n
v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364–65 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that res judicata bars federal
takings claim); Peduto v. City of N. Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725, 729 (3d Cir. 1989) (same); but see
Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299, 1305–06 (11th Cir. 1992) (recognizing a
limited exception to the applicability of res judicata and collateral estoppel to federal takings
claims).
38. Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 127–28 (2d Cir.
2003).
39. Brief for Petitioner at i, San Remo, 545 U.S. 323, 2005 WL 176427.
40. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 326.
41. Id. at 329.
42. Id. at 330.
43. Pullman abstention allows a federal court to decline to hear a lawsuit if a ruling on state
law could resolve the federal constitutional claim; federal courts should avoid deciding the claim
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state court’s decision might moot the federal question.44 The Ninth
Circuit also held that one of the San Remo’s takings claim might be
unripe because it did not seek compensation in state court through an
inverse condemnation proceeding.45
Before returning to state court, San Remo reserved its right to
reenter federal court through England reservation.46 That reservation
was created in England v. Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners,
where the Court held that a party litigating in state court because of
abstention may reserve the right to bring his federal claim in federal
court after state litigation concludes.47 The Eastern District of
Louisiana abstained from hearing England because it found that a state
court may have resolved the case on state law grounds.48 But after
receiving an adverse decision in Louisiana state court, the plaintiffs
sought to return to federal court.49
The England Court stressed that plaintiffs have a right to sue in
federal court.50 Justice Brennan wrote, “[T]here are fundamental
objections to any conclusion that a litigant who has properly invoked
the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federal
constitutional claims can be compelled, without his consent and
through no fault of his own, to accept instead a state court’s
determination of those claims.”51 He concluded, “[T]he right of a party
plaintiff to choose a Federal court where there is a choice cannot be
properly denied.”52
San Remo, after losing its state takings claim in the California
Supreme Court,53 sought to use the England reservation and return to
litigate its federal takings claim in federal court. But the district court
held that issue preclusion prevented San Remo from raising its federal
claim if it could have been resolved in state court.54 The Ninth Circuit
upheld the district court’s decision, holding that neither Williamson

until the state court has an opportunity to address the state law issue. Railroad Comm’n of Tex.
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
44. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 330.
45. Id. at 331.
46. Id.
47. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 421–22 (1964).
48. Id. at 413.
49. Id. at 413–14.
50. Id. at 415.
51. Id.
52. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
53. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 87 (Cal. 2002).
54. San Remo, 41 P.3d at 91.
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County, England, nor Pullman affected the court’s full faith and credit
inquiry.55
Despite Justice Brennan’s explanation in England that a litigant
may return to federal court by “making on the state record the
reservation to the disposition of the entire case by the state courts,”56
the Court upheld the lower court’s determination. Justice Stevens
explained:
Typical England cases generally involve federal
constitutional challenges to a state statute that can be
avoided if a state court construes the statute in a
particular manner. In such cases, the purpose of
abstention is not to afford state courts an opportunity
to adjudicate an issue that is functionally identical to the
federal question. To the contrary, the purpose of
Pullman abstention in such cases is to avoid resolving
the federal question by encouraging a state-law
determination that may moot the federal controversy.57
San Remo’s majority also rejected the argument that issue
preclusion should not apply when plaintiffs are forced into state court.58
The Court expressly rejected the Second Circuit decision, Santini v.
Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management Service. The Second
Circuit had held that a plaintiff could reserve his claim for federal court
review if he is forced to sue in state court because of Williamson
County.59 The court sought a “middle ground” because, “It would be
both ironic and unfair if the very procedure that the Supreme Court
required plaintiffs to follow before bringing a Fifth Amendment
takings claim—a state-court inverse condemnation action—also
precluded [plaintiffs] from ever bringing a Fifth amendment takings
claim.” The court interpreted that, in Williamson County, the Supreme
Court did not intend “to deprive all property owners in states whose
takings jurisprudence generally follows federal law (i.e., those to whom
collateral estoppel would apply) of the opportunity to bring the Fifth
Amendment takings claim in federal court.”60

55.
2004).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 364 F.3d 1088, 1096-98 (9th Cir.
England, 375 U.S. at 339–40 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
San Remo, 545 U.S. at 339–40 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Id. at 341–42.
Santini, 342 F.3d at 118.
Id. at 130.
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But Justice Stevens dismissed the Second Circuit’s argument,
reasoning that there is no right to have a federal claim vindicated in a
federal forum.61
Recognizing the dilemma that the Second Circuit identified, Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurrence, joined by three other justices,
which questioned the logic of Williamson County. The Chief Justice
agreed that the full faith and credit statute precluded federal court
review in San Remo.62 But the Chief Justice was unsure why a claimant
must seek compensation in state court before going to federal court.63
He questioned the underlying idea that state courts were better than
federal courts at resolving land use cases.64 In addition, he observed
that plaintiffs may bring their land use claims directly to federal court
if they involve other constitutional rights, like the First Amendment or
the Equal Protection Clause.65 The Chief Justice insisted that
Williamson County led to an absurd result and put the Fifth
Amendment in an inferior constitutional position. Though he did not
explicitly call for Williamson County to be overruled, Chief Justice
Rehnquist suggested that he thought its reasoning was suspect and that
the Court should reconsider the case.66
C. The Emergence of the Ripeness-Removal and Williamson
County-San Remo Traps and the Efforts to Untangle Them.
After San Remo, the ripeness-removal and Williamson CountySan Remo traps fully formed, making it nearly impossible for takings
litigants to sue in federal court. The ripeness-removal trap arises when
a property owner files a takings claim in state court, following
Williamson County’s requirements, but the government then removes
the Fifth Amendment claim to federal court based on subject matter
jurisdiction.67 Once the case is in federal court, the government argues
61. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 342 (citing Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465
U.S. 75, 84 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103–04 (1980)).
62. Id. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
63. Id. at 349.
64. Id. at 350.
65. Id. at 350–51 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 411 (1986); Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50 (1976); Vill. of Bele Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)).
66. See id (explaining that state courts are competent to adjudicate federal takings doesn’t
explain why federal courts should be restrained from hearing just compensation cases).
67. Indeed, local government lawyers have not hesitated to use the ripeness-removal trap
against property owners. See, e.g., Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 547–48; Mecouch v. Pension Bd. of the
Employee’s Retirement Systems of the Cty. of Milwaukee, 184 F.Supp.3d 684, 689 (E.D. Wisc.
2016); Gelnett v. Twp. of Chapman, 2015 WL 7454757 at *1 (M.D. Penn. Nov. 24, 2015).
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that the landowner’s case must be dismissed because the litigant has
not used an adequate procedure for obtaining compensation. Often,
courts hold that these cases are unripe because the litigant did not go
through state court to seek just compensation.68 This is so even though
the property is only in federal court because the government removed
their case.69
The Williamson County-San Remo trap occurs when a takings
litigant unsuccessfully seeks compensation in state court.70 Because he
has sought compensation in state court, issue preclusion applies to the
takings claim and he will be unable to sue in federal court.71 In other
words, the procedure that ripens a case for federal review also prevents
federal courts from hearing the issue.72
Fortunately, for takings litigants, the Supreme Court and circuit
courts have lessened the impact of these traps. The Court has
repeatedly held that Williamson County’s ripeness rule is a prudential
doctrine, not a jurisdictional requirement.73 Jurisdictional
requirements are constitutionally mandated and must be satisfied
before a court may hear a case.74 On the other hand, prudential
requirements are court-developed policies that allow the judiciary to
decline to hear some cases even where jurisdiction exists.75 Because
Williamson County is only prudential, a federal court may hear a just
compensation case even if Williamson County’s requirements are not
68. See, e.g., Gelnett, 2015 WL 7454757 at *4 (bypassing state court “streamlines litigation by
dispensing with needless discovery and fact-finding”).
69. Id.
70. Scott A. Keller, Note, Judicial Jurisdiction Stripping Masquerading as Ripeness:
Eliminating the Williamson County State Litigation Requirement for Regulatory Takings Claims,
85 TEX. L. REV. 199, 200 (2006) (“When combined with preclusion doctrines, the Williamson
County State Litigation prong prevents a substantial majority of takings plaintiffs from litigating
their claims in federal court.”).
71. Issue preclusion is an estoppel doctrine that prevents a person from re-litigating an issue
that another court has decided. Eli J. Richardson, Taking Issue with Preclusion: Reinventing
Collateral Estoppel, 65 MISS L.J. 41, 41, 45–47 (1995). Essentially, when the same issue was before
another court, issue preclusion will apply. This principle is constitutionally mandated per the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
72. See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 351 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (discussing how the RookerFeldman Doctrine could cause a preclusion issue).
73. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 560 U.S.
702, 742 (2010); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733–34 (1997).
74. See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[T]he core component of
standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article
III”).
75. See generally Bradford C. Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional, 64 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 413, 419–26 (2013) (discussing the differences between prudential and jurisdictional
standing).
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satisfied.76 Thus, Williamson County’s prudential nature may help
property owners access federal court without worrying about issue
preclusion.77
Because Williamson County is not a constitutional mandate, some
courts have held that its requirements may be waived.78 The Fourth and
Sixth Circuits have functionally eliminated the ripeness-removal trap,
partially by recognizing this rule. In Sansotta, a town removed a takings
case properly filed in state court to federal court.79 A year after
removing the case, the town argued that Sansotta’s claim was unripe
because he did not seek compensation in state court.80 The Fourth
Circuit rejected the Town’s argument, explaining that it would not
tolerate gamesmanship.81 The court held that the government waives
Williamson County’s prudential requirement if it removes a case to
federal court.82 According to the Fourth Circuit, a defendant cannot
accede to federal jurisdiction by removing a takings case and then
argue that the federal court does not have jurisdiction.83 Moreover,
heavily relying on Sansotta, the Sixth Circuit made a similar holding in
Lily Investments.84
By recognizing the waiver rule, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits
ensure that takings plaintiffs will at least be able to present their claims

76. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (discussing the difference between prudential and
jurisdictional standing requirements).
77. The futility exception has also weakened Williamson County. That rule allows for
immediate access to federal court if “recourse to state courts would be futile” because state law
already resolved an issue. Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651,
655 (9th Cir. 2003). For instance, in Cedar Point Nursey v. Gould, the court held that the Fifth
Amendment litigant did not have to comply with Williamson County because California state case
law already resolved the issue in a disfavorable way. 1:16-cv-00185-LJO-BAM, 2016 WL 1559271,
at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2016). Because suing in California court would be futile, the court held
that Williamson County did not apply. Id. (citing Agric. Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, 16
Cal.3d 392, 411 (1976) for the proposition that an access regulation does not cause a taking under
the California or United States Constitutions, thus foreclosing recovery in California state court).
78. See, e.g., Lily Investments v. City of Rochester, No. 15-2289, 2017 WL 56753 (6th Cir.
Jan. 5, 2017); Sherman v. Town of Chester, 752 F.3d 554, 554 (2d. Cir. 2014); Sansotta, 724 F.3d at
533.
79. Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 533.
80. Id. at 536.
81. Id. at 545.
82. Id; see also Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(recognizing that cities may waive Williamson County ripening requirements).
83. Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 545.
84. See id. at 546–47 (“[P]ermitting a state or its political subdivision to assert this
requirement after the state or its political subdivision has removed the case to federal court would
allow the state . . . to invoke federal jurisdiction and then object to federal jurisdiction”); Lily
Investments, 2017 WL 56753 at *7.
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to some court. If a takings litigant tries to comply with Williamson
County by litigating in state court, the court will have jurisdiction to
hear his takings claim because state courts can have jurisdiction over
such issues in limited circumstances.85 Alternatively, if the government
removes a takings claim to federal court, then the government acceded
to federal review, and that court has jurisdiction.
However, it is not enough that Williamson County is a prudential
doctrine or waivable. Too many courts stringently apply Williamson
County, making it impossible to escape the ripeness-removal and
Williamson County-San Remo traps.86 Constitutional protections
should not depend on whether one lives in North Carolina or Indiana.87
If Leslie and Ben lived in Charlotte, a city located in the Fourth Circuit,
they could have remained in federal court after Pawnee removed their
case from state court. Unfortunately, for Leslie and Ben, Indiana is in
the Seventh Circuit, which stringently applies Williamson County.
Accordingly, as things stand, the right to seek just compensation
depends on what part of the country one lives in.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROMISE—WHY WILLIAMSON
COUNTY UNDERMINES OUR CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
AND MUST BE ADDRESSED
In this section, I highlight why the Court should address
Williamson County. First, I discuss the federal court’s’ responsibility
to hear just compensation cases and how Williamson County
undermines this duty. Second, I highlight how Williamson County has
created a two-track justice system for different constitutional rights.
Third, I explain how Williamson County discriminates against the
neediest members of society.

85. Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 979, 994–
95 (2010) (discussing situations in which state courts keep jurisdiction, such as with independent
state law questions).
86. See, e.g., Sunrise Detox V, LLC v. City of White Plains, 769 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2014)
(applying Williamson County to an Americans with Disabilities Act case involving a land use
issue).
87. Compare Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 544–50 (explaining why the Fourth Circuit permits waiver
of Williamson County), with Peters v. Vill. of Clifton, 498 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2007) (rejecting
argument that Williamson County should not apply because it is prudential, explaining “[t]he
prudential character of the Williamson County requirements do not, however, give the lower
federal courts license to disregard them”).
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A. Williamson County Undermines the Just Compensation
Clause’s Guarantees and the Federal Judiciary’s Responsibility
to Hear Just Compensation Cases
The Fifth Amendment is a self-executing constitutional provision
that guarantees just compensation whenever the government takes
someone’s property.88 Government must pay for both physical and
regulatory takings.89 As with other federal constitutional provisions,
federal courts seemingly have a responsibility to hear federal
questions.
Proponents of Williamson County’s ripeness rule might ask why
are federal courts responsible for providing a constitutional remedy?
Certainly, state courts have concurrent responsibility to hear federal
constitutional claims.90 In San Remo, Justice Stevens noted that issue
preclusion applies “even when the plaintiff would have preferred not
to litigate in state court, but was required to do so because of prudential
rules.”91 Justice Stevens argued that there is no right to litigate in
federal court, citing Migra v. Warren City School District Board of
Education and Allen v. McCurry.92
88. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (“the self-executing character of the
constitutional provision with respect to compensation . . .” (citing 6 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain
§ 25.41 (3d rev.ed.1972)); Thomas Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128 HARV. L. REV.
1630, 1637 (2015) ([T]he Takings Clause includes an anticircumvention principle to the effect that
the government cannot avoid its obligation to pay compensation by declining to exercise the
power of eminent domain when in all fairness and justice it should do so.” (citations and quotation
omitted)).
89. A physical taking occurs when the government occupies one’s land. Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (“[A] permanent physical
occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may
serve.”). On the other hand, a regulatory taking involves the government imposing a regulation
that “goes too far” and destroys the value of one’s property. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
323, 415 (1922) (“The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”).
90. Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 624 (1884); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 339
(1816); Samuel P. Jordan, Reverse Abstention, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1771, 1789 (2012).
91. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 342.
92. Id. These cases are easily distinguishable though. In Migra, the Court held that a teacher
who successfully sued the school district she worked for and its administration in state court could
not bring a Section 1983 suit in federal court based on the same facts later on. Because she has
already litigated the core facts in state court, she could not now litigate the same issues in federal
court. Unlike in Migra, San Remo Hotel had the rug pulled under its feet. San Remo, 545 U.S. at
328 (denying opportunity to reserve claim under England). In Allen, a heroin dealer brought a §
1983 suit in federal court against the St. Louis Police Department after a police officer violated
his Fourth Amendment rights. 449 U.S. at 92–93. However, the Supreme Court held that res
judicata applied to the dealer’s claim because the search and seizure issue had been litigated
during his state court trial. Thus, the federal judiciary would not provide the dealer a second
chance to re-litigate his claims because he should have brought his § 1983 claim with his
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However, even if preclusion properly applied in Migra and Allen,
federal courts still have a responsibility to resolve federal issues and
play a necessary role in protecting constitutional rights.93 In its earliest
days, the Court explained that federal courts bring finality and unity to
points of contention.94 Article III of the Constitution requires that
federal courts be able to provide the last word for federal questions.95
Although state courts play an important role in enforcing
constitutional rights, federal courts ultimately must define them.96
When federal courts, namely the Supreme Court, provide the final say
for constitutional provisions, they ensure that rights are protected
equally across the country.
If states are mainly responsible for determining the Fifth
Amendment’s constitutional minima, some states could provide the
ability to receive just compensation while others may not.97 Indeed, a
state judiciary hostile to property rights may provide protections well
below what the Supreme Court or any other federal court would
provide.98 Although the Supreme Court could ultimately resolve any
major conflicts between state courts, the chances of Supreme Court
review are low.99 Even if the Supreme Court corrects erroneous
decisions, it may be difficult, if not impossible, for those who have had
their constitutional rights violated ever to get just compensation.

suppression motion.
93. See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 348 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citing Migra and Allen for the
proposition that preclusion properly applied in San Remo).
94. Id. at 348; Michael J. Gerhardt, What’s Old is New Again, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1267, 1283
(2006) (“While it is true that claimants redirected into state courts by the proposed federal
measures would still have access to a judicial forum, they would be denied at least two essential
features of the federal court system—finality and uniformity.”).
95. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty & Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1511 (1987).
96. Id.
97. Compare Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353, 356 (2006) (rejecting economic
development as a public use), with Kaufmann’s Carousel v. City of Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency,
301 A.D.2d 292, 294 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2002) (accepting a broad definition of public use,
including economic development).
98. To be sure, it may be the case that “adequate procedures” are inadequate. State courts
may use Williamson County’s requirement to avoid hearing land use cases. See Gregory
Overstreet, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 91, 123–24 (1994) (“The tragic irony of the ripeness
doctrine a cue from their federal counterparts, claims unripe based on a borrowed.”).
99. See Aaron Tang, The Ethics of Opposing Certiorari Before the Supreme Court, 35 HARV.
J.L. & PUB POL’Y 933, 934–35 (2012).
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B. Williamson County Creates a Two-Tracked Justice System for
Constitutional Claims
Williamson County’s ripeness rule creates barriers for takings
cases that are not present for other constitutional claims.100 Even when
courts analyze a law’s constitutionality by looking at local practices,
there is no blanket ban prohibiting certain constitutional claims from
being heard in federal court. Take the Miller test: courts use this test
to determine whether a work is obscene and not protected by the First
Amendment.101 In conducting the Miller test, courts look to local
standards to define “prurient interest” and to state law to determine
whether a work is patently offensive.102 But they consult national
standards to determine whether the work of art has any artistic value.103
Claimants who allege that a city official violated their First
Amendment right by censoring their works do not have to ripen their
case in state court.104 This is the case, even though it may be that state
judges would be in a better position to decide what a prurient interest
in their communities is.105 If the Supreme Court imposed a statelitigation rule for Miller claims, there would be shock and criticism.106

100. Cf. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 518 (Thomas, J., dissent, 2005) (“The
Court has elsewhere recognized ‘the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been
embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic, when the issue is only whether the
government may search a home. Yet today the Court tells us that we are not to ‘second-guess the
City’s considered judgments,’ when the issue is, instead, whether the government may take the
infinitely more intrusive step of tearing down petitioners’ homes.”).
101. To be sure, the Miller test is often-criticized. Jessica Fisher, Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Ass’n: “Modern Warfare” On First Amendment Protection of Violent Video Games, 8
J. BUS. & TECH. L. 525, 546 (2013). Even so, the Miller test is still good law and used to determine
whether artistic work is obscene and falls outside First Amendment protections. Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. (1973). There are three prongs to this test. First, a court must determine
whether the work appeals to the prurient interest. Id. at 24. Courts look at local standards to
determine what the “prurient interest” is. Id. Second, a court must determine whether the work
depicts in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct or excretory functions. Id. at 24–25 Courts look
to state law to determine this prong. Id. Third, the court must determine whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks any serious literary, scientific, artistic, or political value. Id. at 24. Courts use
national standards to analyze this prong. Id.
102. Id. at 24.
103. Id. at 30.
104. See generally Eclipse Enter., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63 (2d. Cir. 1997) (no issue when
the First Amendment claim was first brought in federal district court).
105. See id.
106. Cf. Michael Kent Curtis, The Fraying Fabric of Freedom: Crisis & Criminal Law in
Struggles for Democracy & Freedom of Expression, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 89, 94 (2011)
(discussing English commentary describing free speech as sacred).
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Commentators would condemn the Court and stress that free speech is
a fundamental right.107
Equal protection claims are also not subject to an “adequate state
procedure” requirement. The Court could hold that Texas or
California cannot violate the Equal Protection Clause until one seeks
all potential state court remedies and those states deny recourse.108 For
instance, if California has a state constitutional provision that prohibits
discrimination based on race, the Supreme Court could require a state
litigant to seek relief in state court first. The Court could stress the
important role state courts have in deciding equal protection cases.
Courts review equal protection claims under either rational basis,
intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny.109 Each of these standards of
review requires the state to identify its interest in passing a law.110
Perhaps state courts should get the first crack at reviewing equal
protection challenges. After all, state courts may be better equipped
to understand the interest proffered by their states.111
If claimants were forced to litigate equal protection cases in state
court before going to federal court, commentators would panic.112 This

107. E.g., Andrew P. Napolitano, A Legal History of National Security & Individual Rights in
the United States: The Unconstitutional Expansion of Executive Power, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY
396, 553-54 (2014) (“Americans must be vigilant to protect our freedoms”); See also Kevin
Williamson, Galileo Redux, NATIONAL REVIEW, (Apr. 3, 2016), http://www.nationalreview.com/
article/433582/free-speech-climate-science-first-amendment (“The First Amendment was
expressly designed to protect political speech, the right to criticize one’s government and its
actions.”).
108. Cf. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. at
194 (explaining that constitution is not violated until just compensation has been sought and
denied). To be sure, some courts have tried to apply Williamson County when there have been
allegations of discrimination. Islamic Cmty. Ctr. for Mid Westchester v. City of Yonkers Land
Pres. Bd., No. 16–CV–7364 VB, 2017 WL 2804997, at 9 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2017). But see Temple
B’Nai Zion, Inc. v. City of Sunny Isle Beach, 727 F.3d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 2013) (declining to
apply Williamson County when plaintiff alleges land use decision was born out of discriminatory
animus).
109. Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (discussing
strict scrutiny); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567-68 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(discussing intermediate scrutiny); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491
(1955) (rational basis).
110. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (discussing how all racial classifications
must undergo strict scrutiny); Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419 (discussing strict scrutiny); Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994); Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (rational basis).
111. See, e.g., Brief. for Respondent at 51–58, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
(discussing Ohio’s state interest in banning gay marriage against an equal protection challenge).
112. Cf. Jesus A. Osete, Voter suppression rears its ugly head, NOGALES INT’L, (Mar. 29,
2016), http://www.nogalesinternational.com/opinion/guest_opinion/voter-suppression-rears-itsugly-head/article_a62ce3e0-f52c-11e5-80ad-7751b9f506e4.html (describing problems with
invalidating the preclearance measures of the Voting Rights Act, and emphasizing the importance
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terror would likely have nothing to do with issue or claim preclusion.
Rather, civil rights advocates would probably decry a state-litigation
rule for equal protection cases because it would appear that federal
courts were trying to undermine the substantive protections of the
Equal Protection Clause.113
It is hypocritical to condemn limiting access for First or Equal
Protection Clause claims while arguing that Williamson County’s
ripeness rule should remain. Under current doctrine, someone who
wants to bring a freedom of speech or equal protection claim does not
have to go through state litigation.114 Yet the Court has not provided
property owners this same dignity of federal review, even though the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects one’s right to just
compensation.115
The state-litigation requirement unfairly relegates the Just
Compensation Clause to second-class status.116 Because the Just
Compensation Clause is like any other constitutional protection, it
should be treated that way absent a compelling argument to the
contrary.117 The Court has not made the affirmative case for the statelitigation requirement.118
of voting rights), with Ian Millhiser, When John Roberts Said Enough Racism in America to Justify
the Voting Rights Act, THINKPROGRESS, (Jun. 18, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/
2015/06/18/3671107/two-years-ago-supreme-court-said-isnt-enough-racism-justify-voting-rightsact/ (describing problems with invalidating some measures of the Voting Rights Act).
113. Cf. Jeffrey Toobin, Justice Scalia’s Shameful Joke, NEW YORKER, (Apr. 28, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/on-gay-marriage-its-not-scalias-court
(criticizing Justice Scalia’s tone during argument for Obergefell v. Hodges); Michael Keegan,
Cleaning up the Supreme Court’s Democracy Mess, HUFFINGTON POST, (Aug. 25, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-b-keegan/cleaning-up-the-supreme-c_b_5529257.html
(criticizing the Court’s invalidation of a provision of the Voting Rights Act).
114. To be sure, some courts have applied Williamson County to any case in which land use is
involved. These cases simply highlight the absurdity of the Williamson County ripeness rule. It is
not apparent to the author what state court litigation does to ripen an Americans with Disabilities
Act case. See generally Eclipse Enters., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63 (no issue when the First
Amendment claim was first brought in federal district court).
115. See Chicago, Burlington & Quality R.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (the Court
found that nominal payment for a public right of way over a railroad was not a denial of the equal
protection rights of the railroad company).
116. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) (comparing takings clause with
other constitutional provisions).
117. See id. (“We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a
part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to
the status of a poor relation in these comparable circumstances.”).
118. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and Cty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 351(2005) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring) (“the Court has not explained why we should hand authority over federal takings
claims to state courts . . . while allowing plaintiffs to proceed directly to federal court in cases
involving, for example, challenges to municipal land-use regulations based on the First
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C. Williamson County Creates a Two-Tracked Justice system for
the Have and Have-Nots
Aside from treating constitutional protections differently,
Williamson County creates a two-tracked justice system between the
wealthy and the rest of society. Many homeowners, like Leslie and
Ben, do not have the resources to deal with local governments’
litigation gamesmanship. Litigation is expensive and most people have
finite resources.119 At some point, rational people will simply give up
because it will no longer be worth defending their rights, thus putting
a de facto expiration date on the Takings Clause.120
The ripeness-removal trap contributes to a two-track justice
system for the poor and the wealthy. First, property owners will
generally be at a disadvantage litigating against the government
because the government usually has more resources.121 Second,
because property owners are suing the government under the Fifth
Amendment, the government can remove their case to federal court.122
Moreover, once a property owner is in federal court, most circuits allow
the government to send the plaintiff back to state court because of
Williamson County.123 While the government may be able to
financially afford this litigation, many property owners are unable to
do so.124
Not all Fifth Amendment litigants will be at a disadvantage. The
wealthy can afford to vindicate their rights while the average person
will struggle to pay their legal bills.125 The wealthy will have an easier
Amendment”).
119. Art Wittich, Are Private Property Rights an Endangered Species in Montana?, 21 MONT.
LAW. 3, 3 (Apr. 1996).
120. But see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 553 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (“Were we to accept the
State’s rule, the [post enactment] transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to
defend any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be
allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause.”).
121. See Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Taking or Due Process?, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 305, 328–31 (2012) (discussing tool of judicial takings that government may
use).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012).
123. See, e.g., Gelnett, 2015 WL 7454757.
124. Cf. Palazzolo, 553 U.S. at 627 (2001) (explaining that the takings clause should not have
an expiration date).
125. Compare Gillian B. White, Inequality Between America’s Rich and Poor Is at a 30-Year
High, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2014/12/inequality-21 (explaining that wealth inequality is increasing); with Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (discussing how without legal aid for the poor, many
indigent individuals may be “‘put on a trial without a proper charger, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible’ in the
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time complying with the state-litigation requirement and a better
chance at ultimately entering federal court. Indeed, the wealthy may
not even have to face eminent domain proceedings in the first place.126
For instance, if a city is aware of a person’s assets and the possibility of
a prolonged legal battle, they might be reluctant to take any actions
that may cause a taking. Instead, the government might prefer to target
politically and economically vulnerable property owners because
minorities and the poor make easier targets.127
IV. TOWARDS A SENSIBLE RESOLUTION OF WILLIAMSON
COUNTY’S TRAPS
To provide a solution for Williamson County’s traps, this section
proceeds in three parts. In the first section, I provide a roadmap for
litigators to generate a case that would allow the Court to narrow
Williamson County. In the second section, I explain how this
minimalist solution undoes the Williamson County-San Remo and
ripeness-removal traps—the two main problems discussed in this
article. Finally, the third section briefly explains how the Court may
respond if lower courts resist a narrowed Williamson County decision.
A. The Minimalist Solution to the Williamson County Dilemma
The major challenge in undoing Williamson County’s problems
has been getting the Court to reexamine the case.128 Since San Remo
was decided, creating the Williamson County-San Remo trap, the
Supreme Court has had many chances to revisit Williamson County,
but has declined to do so.129 Arrigoni is the most recent denial and the
criminal procedure context” (citation omitted)).
126. ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 83 (The University of Chicago Press ed., 2015).
127. See Ryan Merriman, Closing Pandora’s Box: Proposing a Statutory Solution to the
Supreme Court’s Failure to Adequately Protect Private Property, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1345–
46 (2012) (“Liberals, on the other hand, object to the disproportionate impact economicdevelopment takings have on minorities and the poor.”); Paul Boudreaux, Eminent Domain,
Property Rights, and the Solution of Representation Reinforcement, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 47
(2005) (explaining that cities are more likely to condemn the homes of poor and minority
communities if they “are concerned with improving their tax bases, [because] it simply is not
economical to pay attention to the needs or desires of the poor.”).
128. Circuit courts could minimize Williamson County’s effects on property owners, but
generally have not done so. But see Sansotta, 724 F.3d 533 (applying waiver rule); Guggenheim,
638 F.3d at 1116–18 (applying Williamson County in a narrow manner).
129. See, e.g., Arrigoni, 136 S. Ct. 1409; Kurtz v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1156 (2015)
(denial of certiorari); see also J. David Breemer, Ripeness Madness: The Expansion of Williamson
County’s Baseless “State Procedures” Takings Ripeness Requirement to Non-Takings Claims, 41
URB. L. 615, 616 n.11 (2009) (listing cases denying certiorari, asking Court to revisit Williamson
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closest the Supreme Court has come to addressing Williamson
County,130 but only two Justices expressed interest in revisiting the
case. Thus, for those who are concerned about Williamson County’s
effects, it is necessary to find the best way to get two more votes in
support of certiorari.131
Many commentators have called for the Court to overrule
Williamson County,132 and after San Remo, those calls have
increased.133 Because of Justice Thomas’s dissent in Arrigoni, property
right advocates may feel emboldened to push the Court to overrule
Williamson County.134 They should seek to have the case overruled. It
is worth considering other ways to undo Williamson County’s damage
without asking the Court to take the extraordinary step of overruling
the case.135
B. The Court and Minimalism
A problem for takings litigants seeking to overrule Williamson
County is that the Court is a minimalist institution. This has been
especially true since Chief Justice Roberts took the bench.136
“Minimalists try to decide cases rather than to set down broad rules;
they ask that decisions be narrow rather than wide.”137 This theory
requires jurists to decide no more than they must to ensure the
resolution of a case.138 One common trait of a minimalist court is that
County).
130. Arrigoni, 136 S. Ct. at 1409.
131. Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500 (1957), rev’d sub nom. Herdman v. Penn. R.R.
Co., 352 U.S. 518, 519−20 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (discussing the “rule of four” to
grant certiorari).
132. See Bernick, supra note 18, at 66 (citing law review articles calling for the Court to
readdress Williamson County).
133. Keller, supra note 70, at 241 (“After the State Litigation prong is seen as judicial
jurisdiction stripping masquerading as ripeness, this Note argues that the U.S. Supreme Court
should eliminate the Williamson County State Litigation prong.”).
134. See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, Great Dissent!, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (Apr. 25, 2016),
http://gideonstrumpet.info/2016/04/great-dissent/ (endorsing the dissent); Robert H. Thomas,
Quagmire Unabated: SCOTUS will Not Revisit Williamson County (Yet), INVERSE
CONDEMNATION (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/
2016/04/scotus-will-not-revisit-williamson-county-yet.html (endorsing the dissent).
135. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2652 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining that
“special justifications needed to reverse an opinion must go beyond demonstrations (much less
assertions) that it was wrong; that is the very point of stare decisis” in the context of potentially
overruling case requiring compulsory union dues for collective bargaining).
136. Sykes, supra note 20, at 31 (discussing Chief Justice Roberts’s preference to use
minimalist techniques to avoid conflicts with the political branches).
137. Cass Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1996).
138. Id. at 6.
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it will decline to overrule previous cases, abiding by stare decisis to
promote stability and predictability of the law.139
One theory suggests that denying certiorari is a form of
minimalism.140 Professor Cass Sunstein is the most notable proponent
of this theory.141 He argues that the Court may deny certiorari when it
wants more information about the legal facts of a case, when it is
prudent to wait before addressing a major issue, or when it is trying to
avoid issuing an incorrect decision.142 As Professor Sunstein observes,
“Denials are reasonless.
They are entirely rule-free and
untheorized.”143 Because denial of certiorari is the easiest way to leave
a case undecided, it is appropriately characterized as a form of
minimalism.
Knowing the Supreme Court is a minimalist institution, and
assuming denying certiorari is a form of minimalism, takings litigants
probably should not ask the Court to overrule Williamson County.144
If a litigant does so, the Court may follow its minimalist tradition and
simply deny review. For this reason, many recent property rights cases
before the Court have merely asked the Court to refine its prior
decisions.145 For example, San Remo was the last case in which the
Court discussed Williamson County in significant detail.146 There, the
petition only asked whether issue preclusion applied under that precise
factual scenario.147
Given that the Court likes to act in a minimalist fashion, the next
step for those seeking to undo Williamson County’s damage is to find—
or design—a case that would limit Williamson County and San Remo’s
reach, but does not ask the Court to overrule either case. The ideal
case would feature a petitioner that had plausibly complied with the
ripeness requirements, but did not litigate in state court. If a petitioner
had tried to comply with Williamson County, the Court may be more
139. Sykes, supra note 20, at 19.
140. Sunstein, supra note 137, at 15.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 51.
143. Id. at 22.
144. Certainly, one can list many cases over the last decade in which the Supreme Court
explicitly overruled its prior cases, but none of these involve property rights.
145. See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (distinguishing case from other public use suits); San Remo,
545 U.S. 323 (not asking the Court to overrule Williamson County).
146. Although the Court did discuss Williamson County in Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2609,
it only discussed the prudential nature of the decision; it did not address Williamson County’s
tension with other doctrines.
147. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, San Remo Hotel, at ii (Question Presented), available at
https://www.smallprop.org/downloads/SanRemoPetition.pdf.
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likely to grant certiorari because it allows them to simply reject an
overly broad reading of the adequate state procedure requirement.148
Litigants like Leslie and Ben—a middle-class couple who tried to
comply with the abstruse legal requirements—may appear especially
sympathetic.149
C. Using Williamson County’s Language to Design a Minimalist
Case
To find the best “cert-worthy” case, it is useful to start with
Williamson County’s plain language. According to Justice Blackmun,
aggrieved property owners must “seek compensation through the
procedures the state has provided for doing so.”150 “[I]f a State
provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the
property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation
Clause until [he] has used the procedure and been denied just
compensation.”151 What constitutes “an adequate procedure” is not
defined in Williams County, but a few observations are noteworthy.
Justice Blackmun never says that “adequate procedure” requires state
court litigation, like so many circuit courts have claimed.152 Moreover,
“an” and “procedure” are singular terms, suggesting that property
owners need only pursue one procedure.
An attractive minimalist case would involve a takings litigant who
used a non-judicial, state-sanctioned procedure provided for obtaining
compensation instead of seeking compensation through state court.
After being denied compensation through this procedure, the litigant
148. Indeed, the Court has recently taken the opportunity to narrow extremely broad
readings of other statues. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2371−72 (2016) (rejecting
broad interpretation of the Hobbs Act); Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088−89 (2015)
(rejecting broad interpretation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act); Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077,
2090 (2014)
(rejecting broad interpretation of the Convention of the Prohibition of Development and Use of
Chemical Weapons). Although these cases have other elements that are not an issue in takings
cases, such as the rule of lenity and criminal law issues, it is still useful to see how the Court resolve
tricky issues. Statutory interpretation cases are especially useful for this article because I suggest
the Court engage in a pseudo-statutory interpretation of its prior opinion.
149. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari:
Jurisprudential Consideration in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 389, 395
(2004) (“At a more concrete level, the choice of a particular case, with its peculiar set of facts,
among the many that are generally available to resolve an issue can influence the scope and
content of the Court’s opinion on the merits—and possibly the outcome.”).
150. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194.
151. Id. at 195 (emphasis added).
152. See, e.g., Save More Food Mkts, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., No. 16-cv-447-jdp, 2016
WL 4131866 (W.D. Wisc. Aug 3, 2016).
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seeks compensation in federal court. Then, after a circuit court holds
that the takings litigant’s claim is not yet ripe, because he has not
sought compensation in a state court, he petitions for certiorari with a
question presented similar to this, “Whether a non-judicial state
procedure, in which a property owner applies to a state agency to
obtain just compensation for a taking, is an adequate procedure for
obtaining compensation that satisfies Williamson County’s ripeness
requirements.”153
This question presented does not ask the Supreme Court to
overrule its prior case, and it allows the Court to make a narrow ruling.
All the Court must answer is whether the petitioner complied with
Williamson County’s requirements.154 If it holds that the non-judicial
procedure satisfies Williamson County’s requirements, it would
eliminate the state-court litigation requirement.155 This ruling would
confirm what commentators and jurists have been saying for decades:
State courts do not need to review a takings claim before a Takings
Clause violation is ripe.156 Additionally, the Court would not be
breaking new ground; some courts have held that “an ‘adequate
process’ for state compensation can also be administrative relief such
as a state claims commission which awards monetary damages.”157
One lingering difficulty is that “adequate procedure for seeking
compensation” is still vague. To cure Williamson County’s defects, “an
adequate procedure” will have two components: (1) it must be nonjudicial, and (2) it should be a procedure that allows the municipality
to provide compensation. A good rule of thumb for the first prong
would be to ask whether the procedure was created by the legislature,
such as an agency, commission, or board.158 If the procedure was

153. Whether the Court would grant certiorari is certainly a different question. The Court will
typically look to resolve circuit splits or questions of national importance. Sup. Ct. R. 10. Arrigoni
suggests that two justices see resolving Williamson County’s litigation trap as an important
question. But to make this case “cert-worthy,” it may take more strategic litigation throughout
the country to create a circuit split.
154. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012) (applying full faith and credit statute in full judicial
proceedings).
155. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“It is not clear to me that
Williamson County was correct in demanding that, once a government entity has reached a final
decision with respect to a claimant’s property, the claimant must seek compensation in state court
before bringing a federal takings claim in federal court.”); Overstreet, supra note 98, at 118–20.
156. Overstreet, supra note 98, at 118–20.
157. Id. at 118 (citing MAK Co. v. Smith, 763 F. Supp. 1003, 1005 (W.D. Ark. 1991)).
158. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 17 (4th pocket ed. 2011) (defining “administrative
proceeding” as “A hearing, inquiry, investigation, or trial before an administrative agency, usu.
adjuratory in nature but sometimes quasi-legislative.”).
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created by the legislature, that non-judicial procedure would likely
satisfy the first prong.159 The procedure must be non-judicial to avoid
issue preclusion.160 As to the second prong, courts should understand
compensation to be a payment to recoup for a loss.161 Thus, a takings
litigant would satisfy Williamson County’s requirement when he seeks
a monetary payment for a taking from an agency, commission, or
board.
Several examples of what should be adequate state procedures
might help illustrate what would ripen a case for federal review.162 For
instance, the California Tort Claims Act would probably be an
adequate procedure.163 The law provides governmental entities and
takings plaintiffs a chance to negotiate a settlement for an alleged
taking.164
For example, say Sacramento, California declares that a plot of
land is an environmentally sensitive zone, thus preventing its property
owner from building anything on their plot.165 Because Sacramento has
denied all economically viable use of their land, the property owner
wants to file a per se takings claim.166 Knowing Williamson County’s
requirements, the property owner first seeks compensation from a
board that Sacramento established to negotiate settlements for inverse
condemnation claims. If Sacramento’s board pays compensation,
everyone is better off. The owner is paid, Sacramento does not have
to litigate, and the federal dockets remain clear. If the city declines to

159. Cf. id. at 416 (defining “judicial” as “Of, relating to, or by the court or a judge.”).
160. See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 347 (“Whatever the merits of that concern may be, we are not
free to disregard the full faith and credit statute solely to preserve the availability of a federal
forum.”).
161. See generally Tim Kowal, The Restitutionary Approach to Just Compensation, 9 Chap. L.
Rev. 463, 466–74 (2006) (arguing for a broader conception of the Just Compensation Clause to
include restitution payments).
162. One notable circuit case is Temple B’Nai Zion, Inc. v. City of Sunny Isles Beach, 727 F.3d
1349, 1359 (11th Cir. 2013). There, the Eleventh Circuit explained that “the record is sufficiently
developed—thanks in part to two lengthy quasi-judicial hearings held before the Preservation
Board and the City Commission—that the issues we today deem ripe are clearly primed and at
the ready for judicial resolution.” Id. (emphasis added). My suggestion is to hold that non-judicial
remedies are sufficient; but quasi-judicial remedies would also remove the ripeness-removal and
the Williamson County-San Remo traps because there still would be no final agency decision.
163. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 935–935.2 (2012).
164. Id.
165. See PLF clients win in settlement with Tahoe agency, Pac. Legal Found. (Dec. 10, 2015),
https://pacificlegal.org/plf-clients-win-in-settlement-with-tahoe-agency/ (informing that TRPA
was sued for “taking” a couple’s property).
166. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 (declaring when a property owner is denied all economically
viable use of their property, it is a per se taking).
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pay compensation, then the property owner’s claim would be ripe
under Williamson County because he has sought compensation
through an adequate state procedure.
The administrative appeal provided in Mecouch v. Pension Board
of the Employee’s Retirement System is also illustrative of a procedure
for seeking compensation that should satisfy Williamson County’s
requirements.167 In that case, George Mecouch purchased “service
credits” from the Pension Board of the County of Milwaukee to ensure
that his retirement benefits would vest.168 After receiving confirmation
that his retirement benefits would vest, Mecouch retired. Twenty-five
years later (and four years after he had started drawing a pension), the
pension board informed him that it had improperly allowed him to
purchase service credits.169 Thus, the pension board suspended his
pension.170 Mecouch sought to have the pension board reinstate his
payments.171 First, Mecouch sought to have his payments reinstated
through the pension board’s appeal process.172 The appeal board did
not restore his payments,173 although it did say that Mecouch’s claim
was ready for judicial review.174
Because the board informed the litigant that, “he was entitled to
seek judicial review,” his claim should be ripe for review in state or
federal court.175 The procedure was enough to secure compensation
because if the board had agreed with Mecouch, his money would have
been returned and his takings argument rendered moot. Because
Mecouch used a procedure that could have provided him all the relief
he was seeking, his claim should have been ripe under this proposed
test.176
On the other hand, commentators who have called for Williamson
County to be overruled may not be satisfied with narrowing it.
Property rights advocates may argue that this procedure is
unnecessary, noting—and correctly so—that a landowner suffers a
167. Mecouch, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 684.
168. Id. at 686.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 690. To be sure, the Western District of Wisconsin held that Mecouch’s claim was
not ripe because his case had not been ripened through state court procedures because
Wisconsin’s constitution provides a takings claim. Id.
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taking as soon as any government official denies just compensation.177
These advocates may argue that any minimalist case should
acknowledge when a constitutional injury occurs.
This minimalist decision would recognize the scope of a
constitutional injury and recognize that federal courts need flexibility.
Courts see many meritless takings claims. Pro se litigants—and some
low-quality attorneys—often sue cities for takings under strained
theories.178 Many pro se litigants poorly design their cases, causing
their suits to burden an already overworked judiciary.179 By keeping a
requirement for takings plaintiffs to use a non-judicial state procedure,
lower courts provide these plaintiffs a reliable way to get compensation
while relieving pressure on federal judges. In addition, if a plaintiff
fails to get compensation, through a state non-judicial procedure, they
can then go to federal court.
The minimalist solution also would not undo Williamson County’s
prudential nature. If a landowner suffers an egregious taking and files
a well-crafted complaint, and the facts are well developed, a federal
court may choose to hear the case immediately without requiring him
to seek compensation through a non-judicial procedure.180 By
narrowing “an adequate procedure for receiving compensation” to a
single state non-judicial procedure, the Court would provide federal
courts maximum flexibility while protecting property rights.

177. J. David Breemer, You Can Check Out But You Can Never Leave: The Story of the San
Remo Hotel - The Supreme Court Relegates Federal Takings Claims to State Courts Under a Rule
Intended to Ripen the Claims for Federal Review, 33 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 247, 291 (2006) (citing
Berger & Kanner, supra note 15, at 694) (“The fundamental principle underlying this
conclusion—that an action for a taking exists only if the challenged invasion of private property
occurs ‘without just compensation’—is not controversial, but the conclusion that compensation
can be deemed lacking only after state court litigation is dubious.”).
178. See, e.g., Jackson v. Vill. of Western Springs, No. 14 C 3414, 2014 WL 5543844 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 3, 2014); Jarvis-Orr v. Twp. Of Hartford, No. 1:11-CV-1066, 2012 WL 6737740 (W.D. Mich.
Nov. 30, 2012); Moes v. Woodward, Nos. 1:11-CV-912, 1:12-CV-1092, 2012 WL 5830596 (W.D.
Mich. Nov. 16, 2012).
179. See, e.g., Jackson, 2014 WL 5543844, at *1 (“The 100–page, 447–paragraph Complaint is
hard to follow, but it appears that all of Jackson’s claims are related to these zoning decisions and
the Defendants’ activities surrounding the decisions.”); Jennifer Bendery, Federal Judges are
Burned Out, Overworked And Wondering Where Congress Is, HUFFINGTON POST, (Sep. 30,
2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/judge-federal-courts-vacancies_us_55d77721
e4b0a40aa3aaf14b (last visited Oct. 29, 2017) (describing how one federal judge works up to 75
hours a week and at least one full day every weekend to keep up with workload).
180. Along with Mecouch, consider Bendorf v. Ojai Basin Groundwater Mgmt. Agency, No.
CV 11-3877-DSF SP, 2012 WL 3867352 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2012). The plaintiffs filed a pro se
complaint after trying to work through the issues with local agencies. That said, the court in
Bendorf dismissed the case because the pro se plaintiff had not complied with Williamson County.
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Though Williamson County has caused much heartache for
property owners and their advocates, the Supreme Court does not
seem eager to revisit the case.181 Thus, it is necessary to present a case
that would attract the Court’s attention. An ideal case may be one in
which a takings litigant used a non-judicial state procedure, such as the
California Tort Claims Act, to obtain compensation, but was still
denied access to the federal courts because he did not seek
compensation in state court. Such a case would highlight how a good
actor who tried to comply with the Court’s strict requirements could
not get relief, even after complying. To limit Williamson County’s
damage, takings plaintiffs should leave an opening for the Court to
reject the state-court litigation requirement without overruling
Williamson County.
D. Rejecting the State Litigation Rule Would Eliminate the
Ripeness-Removal and Williamson County-San Remo Traps
The immediate benefit from this ruling is that it would eliminate
the Williamson County-San Remo and ripeness-removal traps. If a
state procedure, such as the California Tort Claim Act, ripens a
landowner’s case, then issue preclusion will never arise because using
these procedures does not result in a final judgment. Additionally,
federal courts could continue to decline to hear poorly developed or
nonsensical takings claims.182 Landowners will also no longer fall prey
to unfair gamesmanship tactics. In other words, eliminating the
Williamson County-San Remo trap through my minimalist proposal
ensures that property owners do not resort to federal courts as a first
stop, but it still guarantees that property owners will be able to access
the federal judiciary, while preserving judicial discretion to prevent
docket overrun.183
In addition, holding that a state non-judicial procedure could
satisfy Williamson County would also eliminate the ripeness-removal

181. See Arrigoni, 136 S. Ct. at 1412 (dissenting from denial of certiorari, even though the case
appeared to be an appropriate vehicle to resolve the Justices’ individual concerns about
Williamson County).
182. See, e.g., Jackson v. Vill. of Western Springs, No. 14 C 3414, 2014 WL 5543844 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 3, 2014); Jarvis-Orr v. Twp. Of Hartford, No. 1:11-CV-1066, 2012 WL 6737740 (W.D. Mich.
Nov. 30, 2012); Moes v. Woodward, Nos. 1:11-CV-912, 1:12-CV-1092, 2012 WL 5830596 (W.D.
Mich. Nov. 16, 2012).
183. To be sure, district courts often deal with meritless cases about a wide range of issues.
See, e.g., Seed.S of Ibrahim Corp. v. Comm. of Pa., CIV.A. No. 88-4329, 1988 WL 131380 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 7, 1988). It is simply unclear why courts single out takings claim. If a frivolous claim is
filed, courts should simply dismiss the case rather than apply an odd work around.
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trap. This would prevent governments from using Williamson County
as a stalling tactic. If a takings litigant seeks compensation through a
non-judicial state procedure, then the government cannot seek
removal because the case is not in court.184 After a takings litigant uses
a non-judicial procedure for seeking compensation, the litigant’s claim
would be ripe, and he could sue immediately in federal court.185
Alternatively, if a takings plaintiff sues in state court and has his case
removed to federal court, he would not be sent back to state court for
failing to satisfy Williamson County because he satisfied Williamson
County by seeking compensation through a state non-judicial
procedure.186
Thus, a narrow holding that a state non-judicial procedure can
satisfy Williamson County would undo the Williamson County-San
Remo trap. After compensation is denied in a state non-judicial
procedure, a takings claim would be ripe for judicial review.187 A
municipality also could not argue that issue preclusion applies because
there is no final state court judgment, as was the case in San Remo.188
Thus, allowing the litigant to keep his suit in federal court would not
violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
To be sure, Williamson County would retain the prudential
exception for when a municipality engages in gamesmanship or a case
is well-developed,189 and the futility exception would still apply.190 By
using minimalism and holding that a state non-judicial procedure
satisfies Williamson County, the Supreme Court could undo the
Williamson County-San Remo and ripeness-removal traps.

184. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (removal only applies to case filed in state court).
185. See Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 195 (discussing adequate procedures for providing
compensation).
186. See supra Section IV.A.
187. Id.
188. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 336 (“The modern version of the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738,
provides that judicial proceedings shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of
such State.”) (quotations and citations omitted).
189. See Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates, 353 F.3d at 655 (“The plaintiff must have obtained
a final decision from the governmental authority charged with implementing the regulations and
must have pursued compensation through state remedies unless doing so would be futile.”).
190. See Adam Bros. Farming, Inc. v. Cty. of Santa Barbara, 604 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir.
2010) (“As this case raises only prudential concerns, we have the discretion to waive the
requirements of Williamson County, assume that ripeness is met and continue with our
analysis.”).
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E. What if Lower Courts or Municipal Governments Continue to
Abuse Williamson County?
Even if the Supreme Court holds that a non-judicial state
procedure can be an “adequate state procedure”—thus rejecting state
court litigation as a necessary ripening procedure—lower courts may
resist. They may hold that objectively reasonable state non-judicial
procedures for obtaining compensation do not satisfy Williamson
County’s requirements.191 This would continue to distort Williamson
County. Some judges surely would resist changing Williamson County
because its requirements bar a category of cases from federal court,
thus lowering the courts’ case loads.192
Though the minimalist ruling I propose may lead to courts
distorting Williamson County, the Supreme Court’s watchful eye
would dissuade lower courts and municipalities from playing games. In
his recent dissent from denial in Arrigoni, Justice Thomas suggested
that the Court knew that Williamson County has spawned “confusion
in the lower courts”193 and “inspire[d] gamesmanship in the lower
courts.”194 Chief Justice Rehnquist also argued in his San Remo
concurrence that the state litigation requirement is nonsensical. Thus,
it would be unwise for lower courts to further distort Williamson
County if the Court corrected some of the problems that Justice
Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist identified, yet left Williamson
County breathing.
If lower courts continue to distort Williamson County, the
Supreme Court could overrule it. This would be consistent with the
Court’s practice of narrowing, questioning, and weakening its
precedents before overruling them.195 In recent years, the Court has
first issued a narrow ruling before issuing broad decisions in cases
191. Indeed, some courts have done so in other similar land use cases. See, e.g., Cal. Bldg.
Indus. Assoc. v. San Jose, 189 Cal. 4th 435 (2015) (rejecting theory of legislative exaction, despite
strong precedents of Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013), Dolan,
512 U.S. 374, Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 485 U.S. 825 (1987) (supporting that theory); see
also Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari) (“For at least two decades, however, lower courts have divided over whether the
Nollan/Dolan test applies in cases where the alleged taking arises from a legislatively imposed
condition rather than an administrative one.”).
192. Cf. Grace E. D’Alo, Reflections on Pennsylvania’s ADR Community: Paradise,
Pragmatism, & Progress, 108 Penn St. L. Rev. 309, 310 (2003) (discussing general desire from
courts to decrease their caseload, and using alternative dispute resolution methods to do so).
193. Arrigoni, 136 S. Ct. at 1411
194. Id. at 1409.
195. Compare N.W. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009), with
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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involving campaign finance, voting rights, and gay marriage. The
Court may do the same in a land use case if it is forced to revisit
Williamson County after making a minimalist decision.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the past three decades, Williamson County has caused
property owners much heartache. Takings litigants often try to comply
with Williamson County’s requirements, only to find themselves caught
in either the ripeness-removal or Williamson County-San Remo traps.
This result is unjust because it deprives property owners of a forum to
vindicate their basic constitutional rights; property rights are not
secondary. Williamson County may also cause local governments to
target poorer individuals for takings. Fortunately for property owners,
some members of the Supreme Court are ready to review Williamson
County, though a few more votes are needed before certiorari is
granted.
To encourage the Supreme Court, property rights advocates
should craft an attractive case. Based on the Court’s current
composition, it is best to present the Court with the opportunity to
make a minimalist ruling. In the Williamson County context, this
means that property owners should present a case that asks the
Supreme Court whether a non-judicial state procedure for seeking
compensation, like the California Tort Claims Act, satisfies Williamson
County’s requirements. If the Court holds that it does, it would
eliminate any notion that state court litigation is necessary to satisfy
Williamson County. This would also undo the Williamson County-San
Remo and ripeness-removal traps.
Even with a positive ruling, there is more to be done. Williamson
County has two prongs. This article solely focused on the second
prong: determining what an adequate state procedure is. Even after
narrowing the adequate state procedure prong, the Court should still
solve the issues of the finality prong, which is not discussed in this
article.196
The Court would eliminate several hurdles for landowners by
narrowing Williamson County. My solution would normalize how
property rights are treated in the United States. Both liberal and
conservative jurists recognize that property rights are a fundamental

196. See Overstreet, supra note 98, at 98–100 (discussing MacDonald, Sommer, & Frates v.
Cty. of Yolo, 473 U.S. 340 (1986) and the “meaningful application” and “reapplication” process
in determining whether a county decision is final).
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aspect of the Constitution.197 Interpreting adequate procedure for
obtaining compensation to include non-judicial state procedures would
help put property rights on equal footing with other rights.

197. See, e.g., Arrigoni, 136 S. Ct. at 1411 (Justice Thomas criticizing the court for
transforming property rights into a secondary right); Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012) (“The Takings Clause is designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.”) (citation and quotation omitted).

